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SHOULD ATTORNEYS HAVE A DUTY TO REPORT
FINANCIAL ABUSE OF THE ELDERLY?
Carolyn L. Dessin∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Exploitation of older persons is a growing problem in America.1
As a result, our legal and social systems are struggling to develop
structures that will prevent, remedy and punish instances of abuse. From
all indications, financial abuse is becoming increasingly common, and
can be devastating to its victim.2
States have enacted a wide variety of statutes aimed at alleviating
financial abuse.3 There are two relevant bodies of law: a state’s
protective services law and the state’s criminal law. Although one may
normally think of the purpose of the criminal law as deterring and
punishing crimes, and the protective services law as protecting a state’s
vulnerable citizens, the two bodies of law are frequently closely
intertwined in this area. Thus, a law enforcement officer may have a
duty to notify the appropriate protective services personnel of suspected
abuse and the protective services worker may have a duty to report
suspected abuse to law enforcement.
∗
Associate Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law. J.D., Villanova University
School of Law; M.M., Westminster Choir College; B.M. Ed., Temple University. The author would
like to thank the University of Akron School of Law for its support of the research for this article.
She also thanks Christopher Stewart for his research assistance.
1. See generally Elder Abuse: A Decade of Shame and Inaction: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health and Long Term Care of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 101st Cong. 1
(1990) (discussing prevalence of abuse) [hereinafter 1990 House Report]. The 1990 House Report
was the follow-up to a 1981 report: STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 97TH CONG.,
ELDER ABUSE: AN EXAMINATION OF A HIDDEN PROBLEM (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter 1981
House Report].
2. See 1981 House Report, supra note 1, at XV. Cf. National Survey of Abuse of the Elderly
in Canada, 4 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT (1/2), 5 (1992) (finding that financial abuse is the most
common type of elder abuse in Canada).
3. See generally Carolyn L. Dessin, Financial Abuse of the Elderly: Is the Solution a
Problem?, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 267 (2003) (describing various approaches).
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Each state has a mechanism for protecting vulnerable citizens.
Thus, a state will have some agency charged with protecting the interests
of those who need protection. Additionally, each state has a mechanism
to allow a court of proper jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for the estate
of a person who is adjudged incompetent.
These protective
arrangements intervene when a person is likely to be taken advantage of
by others, but only after the protective services personnel learn of a
potential problem.
With respect to criminalizing exploitation, states have taken a
variety of approaches. Some states specifically criminalize financial
abuse of the elderly.4 Others rely on criminal statutes of general
application to proscribe exploitation.5 Still others use the age or
vulnerability of the victim as a sentencing enhancement.6
In addition to the statutes proscribing exploitation, many states have
chosen to impose a duty to report suspected abuse.7 This is an attractive
addition to the arsenal of weapons to combat exploitation. The rationale
underlying these reporting statutes is simple: many more cases of abuse
are likely to receive the attention they require from law enforcement and
protective services agencies if we impose a duty to report suspected
abuse to one or both of those agencies.
There has been some discussion about the effectiveness of
mandatory reporting statutes. Some see them as an important tool in
remedying elder abuse while others see them as relatively unimportant
because failure to report is seldom prosecuted.8 Regardless of the actual

4. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 368 (2005); COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6.5-103(5) (2004).
5. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3211 (2004) (setting forth offense of theft); see IOWA
CODE ANN. § 726.8 (2003) (criminalizing “wanton neglect or nonsupport of a dependent adult”).
6. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.174a (2004).
7. See infra notes 4-6, 10-14 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Nina A. Kohn, Second Childhood: What Child Protection Systems Can Teach
Elder Protection Systems, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 175, 188 (2003); Seymour Moskowitz,
Golden Age in the Golden State: Contemporary Legal Developments in Elder Abuse and Neglect,
36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 589, 611 (2003); Victoria Vron, Note, Using RICO to Fight Understaffing in
Nursing Homes: How Federal Prosecution Using RICO can Reduce Abuse and Neglect of the
Elderly, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1025, 1031 (2003). See also B.E. Blakely et al., Improving the
Responses of Physicians to Elder Abuse and Neglect: Contributions of a Model Program, 19 J.
GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK 35, 37 (1993) (discussing a model program for improving elder
abuse reporting by physicians); Carolyn Lea Clark-Daniels et al., Abuse and Neglect of the Elderly:
Are Emergency Department Personnel Aware of Mandatory Reporting Laws?, 19 ANNALS OF
EMERGENCY MED. 970, 970 (1990) (stating that “[m]any medical professionals are either unaware
of state mandatory reporting laws or choose to disregard them”); Charles Pratt, Comment: Banks’
Effectiveness at Reporting Financial Abuse of Elders: An Assessment and Recommendations for
Improvements in California, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 195, 202 (2003).

DESSIN1.DOC

2005]

5/2/2005 8:57:53 AM

DUTY TO REPORT FINANCIAL ABUSE OF THE ELDERLY

709

efficacy of such statutes, they exist in many jurisdictions.9 This Article
will therefore put the efficacy issue aside and focus on whether an
attorney can and should report suspected abuse under a mandatory
reporting statute.
Part Two of this article will examine the various states’ approaches
to mandatory reporting of abuse. Part Three will explore the various
states’ rules governing attorney conduct. Part Four will analyze the
interaction of the mandatory reporting provisions with the rules
governing attorney conduct. Finally, Part Five will discuss whether
requiring attorneys to report suspected elder abuse is desirable.
II. THE VARIOUS STATES’ APPROACHES TO MANDATORY REPORTING
States have enacted a variety of statutes mandating reporting of
suspected financial abuse of the elderly. These approaches will be
discussed seriatim.
First, some states mandate that anyone having a reasonable
suspicion that an older person is being abused has a duty to report it.10
This sweeping approach would include attorneys as mandatory reporters.
Second, some states require that only those members of certain
listed professions have a duty to report elder abuse. In some states, that
list includes attorneys,11 while in other states it does not.12
Third, some states do not impose any mandatory duty to report

9. See infra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 3910 (2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-10-3-9 (2004); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 209.030(2) (2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2(C) (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. §
43-47-7 (2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 660.255(1) (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-102(a) (2004);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-7-30 (2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 10-104 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 42-66-8 (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-35-25 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-103(b) (2004);
TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 48.051 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-3-305 (2004); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 35-20-103(a) (2004).
11. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-454(B) (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 52-3-811(3)(f) (2004);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.5093 (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.61A (2005).
12. ALA. CODE § 38-9-8 (2004); ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.010 (2004) ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-28203 (2004); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15630 (2005); COL. REV. STAT. § 26-3.1-102 (2004); 2005
Bill Text CO S.B. 98 (pending legislation to make reporting mandatory in Colorado); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17b-451 (2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-1903 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.1034(1)
(2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-5-4 (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346-224 (2004); IDAHO CODE §
39-5303 (2004); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 320, § 20/2(f-5) (2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235B.3
(2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-1431 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3477 (2004); MD.
CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 14-302 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 19A, § 15 (2005); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.11a (2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5572(16) (2004); MO. ANN. STAT. §
565.188 (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-372 (2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161-F:46 (2004); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 6903 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1606 (2004); WASH. REV. CODE §
74.34.035 (2004); WASH. REV. CODE. § 74.34.020 (2004); W. VA. CODE § 9-6-9 (2004).
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suspected abuse.13 Some of these states establish a procedure by which
one wishing to report abuse may report it.14
III. RULES GOVERNING ATTORNEY CONDUCT
A. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Any mandatory reporting statute immediately implicates the
attorney’s duty to maintain client confidences. Thus, consideration of
the issue must begin with an examination of the contours of that duty.
The provisions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct govern
attorney behavior in most states, although some states have made
significant alterations to those rules.15 As a result of “Ethics 2000,” the
American Bar Association approved changes to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.16 Most states that have adopted some version of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct have not yet changed their
professional conduct rules in accordance with the Ethics 2000
revisions.17 Of the states that have not adopted the Ethics 2000
revisions, all states except Georgia have either a state bar committee
conducting a review of the revisions or have a state bar report issued
pending further action on adopting the revisions.18 Accordingly, this
article will examine both the old and new rules as they relate to
mandatory reporting.19
Although there are clear rules regarding the attorney’s duty to
maintain client confidences, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct do
not directly address the issue of mandatory reporting. Thus, the attorney
should keep in mind the admonition in the Scope of the Rules: “The
13. New York and South Dakota are such states, as are North Dakota, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.2-03 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27d409 (2000); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10225.302 (2000); WIS STAT. ANN. § 46.90 (2004).
14. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.2-03 (2003).
15. An overwhelming majority of states have adopted some version of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. Hence, the discussion in this article will focus on the Model Rules rather
than the older Model Code of Professional Responsibility, including the Ethical Considerations and
Disciplinary Rules. For comparison, this article will briefly discuss the rules of the state of Ohio, a
Code state. See infra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
16. A chart showing the state-by-state status of the Ethics 2000 changes appears at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/jclr/ethics_2000_status_chart.pdf.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id. For a comprehensive state-by-state examination of the Model Rules, see
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING, A HANDBOOK ON
THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, App. 4 (2d Ed. 2001). See also Dan W. Holbrook,
Where There’s a Will: How the New Ethics Rules Affect Estate Planners, 39 TENN. B.J. 31 (2003).
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Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be
interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of
the law itself.”20 Further, the drafters of the Rules did not intend the
Rules to completely define the parameters of a lawyer’s duties.21 Rather,
the drafters intended the rules to operate in a larger social and ethical
context. Thus, an attorney must frequently look beyond the Rules in
resolving difficult ethical dilemmas.
1. Pre-Ethics 2000 Rules
Under the pre-Ethics 2000 version of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, it would be difficult to argue that an attorney
could reveal confidential information concerning potential financial
abuse. Rule 1.6 of the pre-Ethics 2000 Model Rules of Professional
Conduct provides:
RULE 1.6: CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation
of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to
a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct
in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client.22

It would be extremely difficult for an attorney to argue that he
could reveal confidential information pertaining to potential financial
20. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope ¶ 14 (2004).
21. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope ¶ 16 (2004) (providing: “The Rules do
not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no
worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The Rules simply provide a
framework for the ethical practice of law.”).
22. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (2002).
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abuse under this formulation of Rule 1.6. Under subsection (b)(1), only
abuse bad enough to result in serious imminent physical harm could be
revealed, and most financial abuse does not rise to that level.
2. Ethics 2000 Revisions to the Rules
The Ethics 2000 revisions to the Model Rules for Professional
Responsibility made several changes to the rule governing
confidentiality of information. Rule 1.6 of the revised Model Rules for
Professional Conduct provides:
RULE 1.6: CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation
of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the
disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these
Rules; to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to
a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct
in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client; or to
comply with other law or a court order.23

Under this revised version of Rule 1.6, it seems clear that an
attorney could reveal confidential information to comply with a
mandatory reporting statute under subsection (b)(4). Subsection (b)(1)
might also be implicated if the financial abuse or potential thereof is
severe enough that it is likely to result in serious physical harm, which
seems less likely.
What also seems clear, however, is that revised Rule 1.6 would not
allow a lawyer to report potential financial abuse unless his state
requires reporting. Thus, in a state that allows reporting but does not
require it, the attorney could not argue that disclosure of confidential
information relating to the abuse was “to comply with” state law.
23. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (2004).
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B. The Code of Professional Responsibility
Because a handful of states have attorney discipline rules based on
the older Model Code of Professional Responsibility, including the
Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules, a brief comparison of
those rules is warranted. These states’ rules vary fairly significantly, and
the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility will be used as an
example.
The Code of Professional Responsibility Model consisted of three
parts: the Canons, the Ethical Considerations and the Disciplinary Rules.
In the words of the preface to the Ohio Code of Professional
Responsibility:
The Canons of this Code are statements of axiomatic norms,
expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct
expected of lawyers in their relationships with the public, with the
legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody the general
concepts from which the Ethical Considerations and the Disciplinary
Rules are derived.
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent
the objectives toward which every member of the profession should
strive. They constitute a body of principles upon which the lawyer can
rely for guidance in many specific situations.
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are
mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum
level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject
to disciplinary action.24

Each of the relevant Canons, Ethical Considerations and
Disciplinary Rules relating to maintaining client confidences must be
considered in determining whether an attorney can report suspected
exploitation. Canon 4 states that “a lawyer should preserve the
confidences and secrets of a client.”25 Additionally, the following
Ethical Considerations are relevant:
EC 4-1 Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and
client and the proper functioning of the legal system require the
preservation by the lawyer of confidences and secrets of one who has
employed or sought to employ him. A client must feel free to discuss
whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must be equally free
24. OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preface (2002).
25. Id. at Canon 4.
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to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his client. A lawyer
should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in
order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system. It is
for the lawyer in the exercise of his independent professional judgment
to separate the relevant and important from the irrelevant and
unimportant. The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to
hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only
facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper
representation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek early
legal assistance.
EC 4-2 The obligation to protect confidences and secrets obviously
does not preclude a lawyer from revealing information when his client
consents after full disclosure, when necessary to perform his
professional employment, when permitted by a Disciplinary Rule, or
when required by law. Unless the client otherwise directs, a lawyer
may disclose the affairs of his client to partners or associates of his
firm. It is a matter of common knowledge that the normal operation of
a law office exposes confidential professional information to
nonlawyer employees of the office, particularly secretaries and those
having access to the files; and this obligates a lawyer to exercise care
in selecting and training his employees so that the sanctity of all
confidences and secrets of his clients may be presented. If the
obligation extends to two or more clients as to the same information, a
lawyer should obtain the permission of all before revealing the
information. A lawyer must always be sensitive to the rights and
wishes of his client and act scrupulously in the making of decisions
which may involve the disclosure of information obtained in his
professional relationship. Thus, in the absence of consent of his client
after full disclosure, a lawyer should not associate another lawyer in
the handling of a matter; nor should he, in the absence of consent, seek
counsel from another lawyer if there is a reasonable possibility that the
identity of the client or his confidences or secrets would be revealed to
such lawyer. Both social amenities and professional duty should cause
a lawyer to shun indiscreet conversations concerning his clients.
EC 4-3 Unless the client otherwise directs, it is not improper for a
lawyer to give limited information from his files to an outside agency
necessary for statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data processing,
banking, printing, or other legitimate purposes, provided he exercises
due care in the selection of the agency and warns the agency that the
information must be kept confidential.
EC 4-4 The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical
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obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his
client. This ethical precept, unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists
without regard to the nature or source of information or the fact that
others share the knowledge. A lawyer should endeavor to act in a
manner which preserves the evidentiary privilege; for example, he
should avoid professional discussions in the presence of persons to
whom the privilege does not extend. A lawyer owes an obligation to
advise the client of the attorney-client privilege and timely to assert the
privilege unless it is waived by the client.
EC 4-5 A lawyer should not use information acquired in the course of
the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client and a
lawyer should not use, except with the consent of his client after full
disclosure, such information for his own purposes. Likewise, a lawyer
should be diligent in his efforts to prevent the misuse of such
information by his employees and associates. Care should be exercised
by a lawyer to prevent the disclosure of the confidences and secrets of
one client to another, and no employment should be accepted that
might require such disclosure.
EC 4-6 The obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confidences and
secrets of clients continues after the termination of employment. A
lawyer should also provide for the protection of the confidences and
secrets of clients following the termination of the practice of the
lawyer, whether termination is due to death, disability, or retirement.
For example, a lawyer might provide for the personal papers of the
client to be returned to the client and for the papers of the lawyer to be
delivered to another lawyer or to be destroyed. In determining the
method of disposition, the instructions and wishes of the client should
be a dominant consideration.26

The Disciplinary Rules place limits on an attorney’s ability to
reveal confidential information. Disciplinary Rule 4-101 states:
DR 4-101. PRESERVATION OF CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS
OF A CLIENT.
(A) “Confidence” refers to information protected by the attorney-client
privilege under applicable law, and “secret” refers to other information
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be
held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or
would be likely to be detrimental to the client.

26. Id. at EC 4-1 - 4-6.
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(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not
knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the
client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself
or of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients
affected, but only after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or
required by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to
defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of
wrongful conduct.
(D) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees,
associates, and others whose services are utilized by him from
disclosing or using confidences or secrets of a client, except that a
lawyer may reveal the information allowed by DR 4-101(C) through
an employee.27

Thus, with respect to mandatory reporting of suspected
exploitation, Ethical Consideration 4-2 allows the disclosure of
confidential information when required by law.28 Further, Disciplinary
Rule 4-101(C)(2) allows disclosure of confidential information when
required by law.29 Additionally, if the abuser is the attorney’s client,
Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(3) allows the lawyer to reveal confidential
information relating to his client’s intended criminal activity.30
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at DR 4-101.
Id. at EC 4-2.
Id. at DR 4-101(C)(2).
Id. at DR 4-101(C)(3).
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Accordingly, an attorney could report suspected abuse under a
mandatory reporting statute, which Ohio has enacted.31
IV. THE INTERACTION OF MANDATORY REPORTING AND RULES
GOVERNING CLIENT CONFIDENCES
When a state requires an attorney to report suspected abuse of an
older or vulnerable person, it immediately creates the possibility that an
attorney will be required to reveal confidential information learned in the
course of the attorney-client relationship. Despite this inevitable
interaction of a mandatory reporting duty and the attorney’s professional
duty to keep a client’s confidences, few states have spoken definitively
on the issue.32 Thus, an attorney is often left to determine whether he
can and should report abuse.
Three basic approaches to the interaction are possible. First, a state
may impose a mandatory reporting duty on attorneys without speaking
on the issue of the attorney’s duty to maintain client confidences. This is
the approach in Arizona,33 Delaware,34 Indiana,35 Louisiana,36
Mississippi,37 New Mexico,38 North Carolina,39 Ohio,40 Oklahoma,41
Rhode Island,42 Tennessee,43 Utah44 and Wyoming.45
Second, a state may impose a reporting duty on attorneys and
provide that an attorney may raise the attorney client privilege as a
defense for failing to report. This is the approach taken by Florida,46
Kentucky,47 Montana,48 Nevada,49 New Hampshire50 and South
31. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.61(A)(6)(g)(ii) (2005).
32. See e.g., infra notes 33-52.
33. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-454(B) (2004).
34. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 3910 (2005).
35. IND. CODE ANN. § 12-10-3-9 (2004).
36. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2(C) (2004).
37. MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-47-7 (2004).
38. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-7-30 (2005).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-102(a) (2004).
40. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.61A (2005).
41. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 10-104 (2004).
42. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-66-8 (2004).
43. TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-103(b) (2004).
44. UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-3-305 (2004).
45. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-20-103(a) (2004).
46. FLA. STAT. §§ 415.1034, 415.1045 (2004).
47. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.030 (2004). In Kentucky, an Attorney General’s Opinion
provides that an attorney need not, in fact cannot, report domestic abuse if a client directs otherwise.
Ky. Op. Att’y. Gen. 83-367 (1983). Presumably this same reasoning would apply to elder abuse,
although an argument for a different approach could be made. For a discussion of personal
autonomy concerns involving elder abuse reporting, see infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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Carolina.51
Third, a state may impose a reporting duty on attorneys and
specifically abrogate the attorney-client privilege when the attorney
suspects that abuse is occurring. Only Texas takes this approach to the
interaction of mandatory reporting and the attorney’s duty to protect
client confidences.52
In the remaining states, an attorney is not under an obligation to
report suspected abuse of an older or vulnerable person. Frequently,
however, there is a mechanism in place should the attorney choose to
report such abuse.53 The attorney in these states is faced with a difficult
question: can he report potential abuse? In light of the language of
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 in both the pre- and post-Ethics
2000 versions, it is unlikely that an attorney could argue that he was
reporting to avoid serious physical harm or comply with law.54 Thus, it
seems unlikely that an attorney could argue that he was allowed to report
if the report required the disclosure of otherwise confidential
information. Under a Model Code formulation, the attorney might be
able to reveal confidential information regarding commission of a crime,
but only if his client is the abuser rather than the victim and only if the
crime has not yet been committed.55
V. THE DESIRABILITY OF REQUIRING ATTORNEYS TO REPORT
SUSPECTED ELDER ABUSE
Although empirical study of the issue is difficult if not impossible,
there have been reliable estimates that elder abuse is widely
underreported. One study suggested that only one in eight cases gets
reported.56 It seems clear that society has an important interest in
attempting to prevent and remedy abuse.57 In light of what appears to be

48. MONT. CODE ANN. § 52-3-811(3)(f) (2004) (providing an attorney has an obligation to
report suspected exploitation unless the attorney acquired the facts causing the suspicion from a
client and the information is protected by the attorney-client privilege).
49. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.5093 (2004) (providing an attorney has an obligation to
report suspected exploitation unless the attorney acquired the information underlying the suspicion
from a client who has been or may be accused of the exploitation).
50. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161-F:48 (2004).
51. S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-35-50 (2004).
52. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 48.051 (2004).
53. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.2-03 (1999).
54. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (2004).
55. OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (2002).
56. See 1990 House Report, supra note 1.
57. See generally 1990 House Report, supra note 1.
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significant underreporting of incidences of abuse, mandating reporting
of suspected abuse is a rational attempt to accomplish increased
reporting.
Any discussion of the desirability of requiring attorneys to report
suspected elder abuse must begin with an attempt to define of such
abuse. When defining financial abuse, states generally rely on concepts
like the “misuse” of another’s assets without “consent.” The difficulty
in precisely defining exploitation comes in the attempt to give meaning
to the fairly vague term “misuse.”58
Most alleged incidents of exploitation involve the transfer of assets
from one person to another. In order for a transfer to be a “misuse,” it
would probably have to be made involuntarily or without consent. This
presents the attorney with a difficult situation. How can an attorney look
inside the client’s mind to determine whether a transfer is being made
with consent? Of course, it is impossible to “know” the subjective intent
of another. The attorney will have to rely on the client’s statements and
surrounding actions and on the attorney’s impressions of the propriety of
the situation as a whole.
A further difficulty for the attorney arises from the very nature of
intra-family transfers. Consider a mother who comes to the attorney and
declares that she wants to transfer a major portion of her assets to her
son immediately and as an outright gift. It is impossible to state that
such a transaction is per se abusive or per se not abusive. If the client is
competent and is making the transfer voluntarily and knowingly, the
transfer is probably not a product of exploitation. People transfer assets
for any number of reasons - pure donative intent, estate planning,
entitlement planning, or persuasion by the donee to name but the few
most common motivations.
Thus, even when a client declares an intent to transfer the bulk of
her assets, the attorney should not simply conclude that the transfer is
abusive. Such a conclusion would be a serious intrusion on the personal
autonomy of the donor. As long as the attorney thinks that the client is
capable of making an informed decision, the attorney should not equate
what the attorney views as an unwise choice with exploitation.
Nevertheless, it is important that attorneys consider the potential for
abuse in property transfers. In addition to an attorney’s duty to maintain
client confidences, an attorney also has a duty to provide competent

58. Sometimes, the statutory proscription is so vague that it fails to pass constitutional muster.
See James Cuda v. State of Fla., 639 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. 1994) (holding that FLA. STAT. ch. 415.11
(1991) is unconstitutionally vague).
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representation.59 It would be difficult to argue that an attorney that
allows a known abusive transfer of assets to proceed is providing that
representation.
Thus, despite the difficulty of the task, the frequent role of the
attorney as a client’s most trusted and knowledgeable advisor suggests
that attorneys cannot be relieved of a duty to consider whether proposed
transactions are abusive. Other than the transferor and transferee, the
attorney may be the only person to know that a transfer is being made.
Although legislative histories are silent on the topic, this is most likely
the rationale that has led some states to make attorneys mandated
reporters. Similarly, some states have chosen to make other trusted
financial advisors mandatory reporters, probably for the same reason.60
The attorney, then, is faced with the difficult task of deciding
whether a particular transfer requested by a client is potential abuse. In
this regard, an attorney will need to use his or her best judgment in light
of the circumstances surrounding the transaction. There is no easy
formula for deciding when a transaction is abusive. The transferor’s
clear sense of the purpose for the transaction is important, but the
attorney must be careful not to impose his or her feelings about the
worth of that purpose on an otherwise competent client.
There are, of course, two added complications that must be
considered. First, it is not unusual for an older client to be brought to the
lawyer’s office by another person. Frequently, that person remains in
the office with the older client during consultation with the lawyer. This
sometimes raises an issue concerning who the client is.
Consider a situation in which an adult child brings her father to the
attorney’s office and sits with him during the lawyer’s consultation. The
daughter tells the lawyer, “Dad wants to re-title the house in my name.”
Presumably the lawyer would not take such a step without being certain
that that is what the father, the asset’s owner, really wants. But who is
the client in that circumstance? The daughter? She is the one who
directed the lawyer’s work. The father? He is the one for whom the
work is really being done. Both the daughter and the father? Their
presence together in the lawyer’s office could suggest that they view this
as a joint representation.
There is some literature about the ethical considerations of
59. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (2004) (providing: “A lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”).
60. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 46-454(B) (2004) (applying to accountants); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-28-203 (2004) (covering bankers).
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representing multiple members of the same family who belong to
different generations.61 Sadly, that literature suggests that there are no
easy answers for the attorney involved with members of multiple
generations of the same family. That attorney may frequently find
himself in situations in which he is unsure of who the real client is and
whether he has is representing clients with conflicting interests. In most
cases, the Model Rules provide no clear answer.
Second, an attorney may be asked to accomplish a transfer of assets
from an older person to a younger person, by the younger person. This
raises several ethical questions. Again, there is the issue of determining
who is the client. Many attorneys take the position that the unseen asset
owner is the client, despite the fact that he is not the one directly
consulting the attorney. If this is the case, if the transferee pays the
attorney’s fee, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct give guidance
about the attorney’s responsibilities.62 The discussion above regarding
maintaining client confidences would apply equally to this situation
because the potential victim is still the client.
On the other hand, the attorney may consider the transferee to be
his client. Were that the case, the attorney would be learning of the
potential abuse from the perpetrator rather than the victim. Under the
older Model Code of Professional Conduct, an attorney can reveal
confidential information concerning his client’s intent to commit a
crime.63 Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, however,
there is no such exception to the duty to maintain client confidences.64
Two basic policies compete in attempting to resolve the issue of
whether attorneys should be mandated, permitted and encouraged to
reveal client confidences relating to whether exploitation is occurring.

61. See, e.g., Russell Carlisle, Model Rule 1.6 – Confidentiality of Information, NAELA
QUARTERLY, Winter, 2001 (stating that “joint representation pervades the practice of elder law. In
the elder law setting, the persons present at the initial conference almost always include other family
members, either spouse or children.”); Teresa Stanton Collett, Response to the Conference: The
Ethics of Intergenerational Representation, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453 (1994); Carolyn L. Dessin,
Protecting the Older Client in Multi-Generation Representations, 30 FAM. L.Q. 247, 247 (2004).
62. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(f) (2004), which provides:
(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client
unless:
(1) the client gives informed consent;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the
client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.
Id.
63. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 4-101(C)(3) (1980).
64. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (2004).
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First, there is a strong policy underlying the protection of client
confidences. Second, there is an equally strong policy underlying the
protection of vulnerable citizens from abuse.
How these two policies should be balanced depends on whether the
client is the victim or the abuser. If the client is the victim, the attorney
should report potential abuse only in two very limited circumstances.
First, an attorney should report suspected abuse if he believes the client
lacks the facilities to understand the fact that he is being abused. This
would be a state of mind similar to the standard for determining
incompetence. I am not, however, suggesting that a client must be
adjudged incompetent before the attorney can conclude that he lacks the
facilities to understand that he’s being abused.
This focus on the client’s state of mind gives the appropriate
respect to the client’s personal autonomy. The attorney will report
suspected abuse only if the attorney in her best judgment believes that
the client’s state of mind is such that he could not consent knowingly to
the transfer. There is no provision for this in states that have no
mandatory reporting statute or in states that have disciplinary rules that
do not allow revealing client confidences “to comply with law,” but the
spirit of the disciplinary rules to provide competent representation
should be used to allow such reporting.
Second, an attorney should report suspected abuse when he learns
of the abuse from the perpetrator, i.e., the perpetrator is his client.
Again, there is no explicit provision for this in states that have no
mandatory reporting statute or in states that have disciplinary rules that
do not allow revealing client confidences “to comply with law,” but the
importance of preventing and remedying exploitation of the elderly
should overcome the duty to maintain client confidences in those
circumstances.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sadly, financial abuse of older citizens seems to be a rapidly
growing problem. As states look for solutions, mandatory reporting of
suspected abuse by those most likely to see the signs of abuse is one
attractive weapon against abuse. Although many have criticized
mandatory reporting as ineffective, there is no reason to do away with it
if some reports of suspected abuse are made that would otherwise not be
made.
Attorneys are in an excellent position to discover abuse, particularly
financial abuse. An attorney is frequently an older client’s most trusted
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advisor on financial matters. Further, the attorney is often the only
person with access to “the big picture” – the client’s net worth, assets,
estate plans and tax returns. Accordingly, the attorney may be the only
person with enough knowledge of the client’s financial situation to be
able to spot a potentially abusive transaction.
In sum, then, the societal interest in protecting a vulnerable person
from abuse is so compelling that the attorney’s duty to maintain client
confidences should not defeat the furthering of that interest. When an
attorney has reason to suspect that abuse is occurring or will occur, the
attorney should report that potential abuse to the appropriate protective
authorities if the client seems incapable of consenting to the allegedly
abusive conduct or if the attorney learns of the conduct from the alleged
abuser. Such reporting is a necessary limitation on the maintenance of
client confidences that may help stem the rising tide of abuse of the
vulnerable.

